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Nuremberg Trials And 
International Law 
by Mary Jean Lopardo 
The outcome of the Nuremberg trials 
was a judgment which imposed criminal 
sanctions against specific individuals who 
were held personally responsible for plan-
ning and waging the Nazi war of aggres-
sion. This historic, judicial proceeding 
was conceived in London, England on 
August 8, 1945 when the United States, 
Great Britain, France and the Soviet 
Union established the International Mili-
tary Tribunal for the trial and punishment 
of the major Axis war criminals. These 
four Allied powers provided a Charter 
which defined the constitutional and juris-
dictional powers of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal and the laws and procedures 
it was to follow during the Nuremberg 
trials. 
Between November 20, 1945 and Oc-
tober 1, 1946, twenty-two Nazi war crim-
inals were tried at Nuremberg for the 
follOWing offenses as outlined in Article 6 
of the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal: 
(a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, 
planning, preparation, initiatiori or 
waging of a war of aggression, or a war 
in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances, or participa-
tion in a common plan or conspiracy for 
the accomplishment of any of the 
foregoing: 
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of 
the laws or customs of war. Such viola-
tions shall include, but not be limited 
to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation 
to slave labor or for any other purpose 
of civilian population of or in occupied 
territory, murder or ill- treatment of 
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, 
killing of hostages, plunder of public or 
private property, wanton destruction of 
cities, towns or villages, or devastation 
not justified by military necessity; 
(c) Crimes Against Humanity: namely, 
murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhuman acts 
committed against any civilian popula-
tion, before or during the war; or per-
secutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crimes within the 
Ill] THE FORUM 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or 
not in violation of domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated, 
Leaders, organizers, instigators and ac-
complices participating in the formula-
tion or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit any of the 
foregoing crimes are responsible for all 
acts performed by any persons in ex-
ecution of such plan, 
Of the twenty-two Nazi defendants, 
Schacht, von Papen and Fritzsche were 
found not guilty on any counts; Hess, 
Funk, Doenitz, Raeder, von Scherach, 
Speer and von Neurath received prison 
terms ranging from ten years to life; 
Goering, von Ribbentrop, Keitel, 
Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg, Frank, Frick, 
Streicher, Saukel, JodI, Bormann and 
Seyes-Inquart were sentenced to death by 
hanging. Although only twenty-two Nazis 
were tried with but twelve sentenced to 
death, the judgment at Nuremberg exer-
cised a tremendous impact, not only in 
serving as a catharsis for the world con-
science, but also in setting unprecedented 
landmarks in international law. 
The Nuremberg arena should be viewed 
as a milestone in the development of in-
ternational law since there existed no 
judicial precedent for the creation of an 
International Military Tribunal. Also, 
there were no legislative guidelines man-
dating such action because there is no in-
ternational legislative body. The innova-
tive concepts of international law spring-
ing from the Nuremberg incident were 
derived basically from the sources govern-
ing all international legal principles, 
namely, written treaties, agreements and 
conventions such as the Hague Conven-
tions of 1899 and 1907, the Kellogg-
Briand Pact of 1928, the Geneva Prisoner 
of War, Red Cross and Protection of 
Civilian Conventions of 1929 and 1949; 
however, all of these treaties state general 
principles on the rules of war and remain 
silent as to the means of enforcement and 
proscribed penalties. Secondly, prohibi-
tions common to the vast majority of 
penal codes employed in civilized States 
were utilized. Thirdly, these sources were 
supplemented by customary or common 
international legal concepts governing 
humanitarian views of warfare. 
In essence, the Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal and the ensuing 
judgment at Nuremberg set the revolu-
tionary precedent that a violation of inter-
national legal principles can be an inter-
national crime, even when no specifiC 
treaty provisions exist precisely defining 
the crime and sanctions to be applied. The 
International Military Tribunal greatly ex-
panded international law by its final affir-
mation that individuals could be held 
criminally responsible for their roles in 
the planning and waging of a war of ag-
gression. This result of the Nuremberg 
trials so impressed the United Nations 
that on December 11, 1946 the General 
Assembly affirmed a resolution offiCially 
recognizing the principles of international 
law as enumerated by the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal and the 
Nuremberg judgment. Thus, the judgment 
at Nuremberg clarified the United Nations 
pOSition for the future that international 
law does prohibit aggressive warfare and 
that a breach of this international concept 
can lead to serious sanctions against in-
dividual offenders. 
* * * 
The Nuremberg trials have been both 
extolled as a milestone in the develop-
ment of international law and vehemently 
criticized as a travesty of justice. This dis-
crepancy of opinion in assessing the prin-
ciples of international justice espoused by 
the Nuremberg tribunal was due to the 
clash between radically opposed political 
traditions debated before and during the 
Nuremberg trials. 
On the one hand, there existed the 
belief that not all is fair in war and that 
there is no justification for cruelty. The 
ruthless torture, rapine, massacres, 
enslavements and calculated executions 
committed by the Nazi henchmen in their 
quest for world dominance defied the laws 
of legitimate warfare. The victims of Nazi 
bestiality cried out for retribution and in 
order to reestablish world law and order, 
justice through law was needed to punish 
individual malefactors for their heinous 
crimes against humanity. The general 
consensus among the major Allied Powers 
was that in order to salvage our heritage 
of justice, war criminals had to be 
punished to guard against future war 
atrocities. 
On the other hand, those who opposed 
the International Military Tribunal 
claimed that justice could not be served 
whenever the victor tried the vanquished. 
The advocates of this pOSition viewed an 
international trial of war criminals as a 
mock-trial which would end in a blood 
bath for seeking vengeance. 
Aside from these intense, emotional gut 
reactions lay the main issues. At bottom 
level, the debate centered around two ma-
jor queries: 1) whether aggressive warfare 
could be classified as an international 
crime and 2) whether particular in-
dividuals involved in the planning and ex-
ecution of such a war could be prosecuted 
for their acts? Five salient arguments 
were advanced in affirmation and in nega-
tion to the above disputed questions. 
First, condemnation stemmed from the 
legal standpoint that there existed no 
judicial or legislative precedent in modern 
history for the creation of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal. Those adamantly 
opposed to the tribunal and its Charter 
asserted that it was an ad hoc creation of 
the four victorious Allied Powers and as 
such, served as a source of new law. 
Those who subscribed to the concepts 
of the International Military Tribunal 
adhered to the ideological view that "It is 
a universal principle of jurisprudence that 
in cases otherwise doubtful the rule or in-
terpretation which gives the most reason-
able results (is) to be applied; and the law 
of nations is as much entitled to the 
benefit of that principle as any other kind 
of law." In rebuttal, it was alleged that in-
ternational law is not statutory in nature, 
but founded upon principles of reason and 
justice defined in terms of treaties and 
assurances, with most of its principles 
comprlsmg customary, unwritten rules 
developed over the years and accepted 
among civilized States. It was further 
stressed that international law is not a 
static system but a progressive one, grow-
ing as the world grows. Thus, an accept-
ance of the opposition's antiquated 
reasoning would vitiate both reason and 
justice. 
The argument encompassing customs 
and traditions that have been universally 
accepted was buttressed by natural law 
philosophers dating back through the 
ages. St. Augustine espoused some of the 
earliest views on peace and war by dis-
tinguishing between just and unjust wars. 
"To make war on your neighbors, and 
thence to proceed to others, and through 
mere lust of dominion to crush and sub-
due people who do you no harm, what 
else is this to be called than robbery on a 
grand scale?" According to Augustine, 
only wars fought in self-defense can be 
considered just and no other motive is a 
proper one for war since the ultimate aim 
of a just war is the peace which it should 
bring between warring States. 
Augustine's theories were further 
elaborated on by St. Thomas Acquinas in 
his Summa Theologica. He stated three 
postulates necessary for a just war: first, 
proper and just authority of the ruler to 
wage the war, second, a just cause such as 
self-defense and third, that peace be the 
objective of the war. Acquinas also 
asserted that "custom has the force of a 
law, abolishes law and is the interpreter of 
law. Obviously, the diabolical Fuehrer did 
not share such lofty ideals as he shouted, 
"I shall shrink from nothing. . . No so 
called international law, no agreements 
will prevent me from making use of any 
advantage that offers." Hugo Grotius, 
referred to as the father of international 
law, defined just and unjust wars in the 
tradition of his Catholic predecessors. 
Grotius also declared that the only just 
cause for war is self-defense and that the 
only justification for war is to promote 
justice. He believed that right reason is 
the only basis for ascertaining the proper 
conduct of States in relation to their deal-
ings with other States. "The dictate of 
right reason which points out that a given 
act because of its opposition to or confor-
mity with man's rational nature, is either 
morally wrong or morally necessary, and 
accordingly forbidden or commanded by 
God, the author of nature." Thus, in ac-
cord with this mode of philisophical 
thought, the International Military Tri-
bunal in its final judgment at Nuremberg 
reiterated these views by stating that wag-
ing an aggressive war was not only an in-
ternational crime, but the supreme inter-
national crime. 
Second, it was frequently objected that 
the International Military Tribunal was in 
fact dispensing ex-post facto or retroac-
tive law. The rationale behind the prohibi-
tion against ex-post facto justice is that 
the offender is subject to arbitrary and 
capricious sanctions which are fundamen-
tally unjust, since he had no prior notice 
that his actions would be deemed criminal 
in nature. The argument offered by the 
critics was that, "(With) no World-State 
there can be no world law; and because 
there is no world law, there can be no 
world crime. An act which is not a crime is 
not justifiable before a judicial tribunal." 
It was emphasized that in the absence of 
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any specific, detailed codes of interna-
tional penal law, prosecution of ag-
gressive warfare as a criminal offense fell 
squarely within the ambit of ex-post facto 
justice. Republican Senator Robert A. 
Taft avowed this position when he 
asserted, "It is completely alien to the 
American tradition of law to prosecute 
men for criminal acts which were not 
declared to be so until long after the fact. 
The Nuremberg Trials will forever remain 
a blot on the escutcheon of American 
jurisprudence. " 
This contention was negated by the 
assertion that all those charged with war 
crimes had fair warning that wars of ag-
gression, without the justification of self-
defense, had universally been held contr-
ary to international law via treaties, 
agreements and assurances among na-
tions, even though specific sanctions had 
not been delineated. To hold otherwise 
would render nugatory such treaties as the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, 
The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, and the 
Geneva Prisoner of War, Red Cross and 
Protection of Civilian Conventions of 
1929 and 1949. It was pointed out that it 
could hardly be unjust to punish those 
who waged an aggressive war in defiance 
of such treaties and assurances to keep 
peace, but that it would be unjust to allow 
such an injustice to go unpunished. 
Particularly relied upon were the provi-
sions of the Paris-Peace Pact of 1928, 
more commonly referred to as the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, which bound sixty-
three signatory nations, including Ger-
many. This Pact stated, "the High Con-
tracting Parties solemnly declare in the 
names of their respective peoples that 
they condemn recourse to war for the 
solution of international disputes and re-
nounce it as an instrument of national 
policy in their relation with one another." 
Although this Pact did not specify 
penalties for violations or assign personal 
liability to violators, a strict interpretation 
of this document implied that waging an 
aggressive war was in express violation of 
its mandates and outlawed as such. Con-
sequently, it was cited repeatedly to 
reaffirm the argument that aggressive war 
was a recognized criminal concept in the 
international legal system. 
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Third, critics called attention to the fact 
that charging Germany with waging an 
aggressive, illegal war was a deprivation 
of her right of national sovereignty. Pri-
mary emphasis was placed on the recog-
nized international principle that no State 
has jurisdiction over the acts of another 
State. This stance was propounded by all 
who accepted the jurisprudence of legal-
positivism as evinced by the philosopher, 
John Austin. This school of thought main-
tained that it was inherently unjust for any 
State to subjectively assert that another 
State had waged an unjust war of aggres-
sion. "Positivism tends to assume that the 
Sovereign State is the only subject of in-
ternational law; that it is under no obliga-
tion except those which it has accepted by 
valid agreement or clear acquiescence in a 
general custom; that such obligations are 
to be narrowly construed under the theory 
that consent to qualifications of 
sovereignty cannot be assumed; and that 
consequently concrete obligations cannot 
be implied even from formal consent to 
general principles." 
This allegation was belied of its validity 
since the International Military Tribunal 
was not trying the State as such but only 
individual citizens of the State. Although 
it was conceded that Sovereign States 
could not be subjected to foreign jurisdic-
tion without their consent, it was asserted 
that no such prinCiple applied to in-
dividuals and that the International Mili-
tary Tribunal exercised jurisdiction only 
over German citizens and not over the 
State of Germany. The Charter of the In-
ternational Military Tribunal established 
its jurisdiction by reasoning that all States 
had authority to set up tribunals to try 
persons within their custody for war 
crimes if those crimes threatened its 
security. Since any of the party States to 
the Charter could exercise such jurisdic-
tion on an individual basis, they could ex-
ercise it collectively as well. Furthermore, 
Germany had unconditionally surren-
dered to the Allies, giving these States the 
right to exercise power over her provided 
they applied the basic prinCiples of justice 
which the victor must observe toward the 
occupants of an annexed State. 
Fourth, opponents urged that the 
doctrine of Act of State cloaked State offi-
cials with immunity for crimes committed 
in the name of the State. The Act of State 
dogma prohibited the punishment of in-
dividuals for actions committed on the 
command or approval of the State, 
because such individuals' actions were 
imputed to the State. Therefore, the op-
position held that responsibility for the 
actions of individuals rested upon the 
State as an entity, and not upon the in-
dividuals who were accorded the status of 
'instruments' of the State. 
This doctrine was renounced on the 
ground that it was a fallacious premise. 
The first argument advanced was that 
historically, heads of State and officials 
had been held criminally responsible for 
initiating and waging wars of aggression. 
Two notable examples were the cases of 
Frederick the Great and Napoleon 
Bonaparte. Frederick the Great was held 
to answer to the Imperial Crown under 
threat of banishment for his alleged 
breach of the peace by his invasion of 
Saxony. Also, Napoleon was outlawed as 
an enemy and disturber of the peace by 
the Imperial Crown of France and 
banished by decree to St. Helena. So, 
historically, heads of State had been held 
accountable for resorting to aggressive 
warfare. 
An even more persuasive argument was 
that it was intrinsically unjust to punish a 
State as a whole for the wrongdoings of 
particular individuals, while allowing the 
malefactors to escape punishment due to 
an archaiC, legalistic technicality. Also, in 
order to be effective, sanctions must oper-
ate against individuals and not States. 
Thus, realistically, the Act of State 
doctrine was not viable. The International 
Military Tribunal strongly believed that 
international law imposed duties upon in-
dividuals, as well as upon States. 
Therefore, when crimes against interna-
tional law are committed by individuals, 
only their punishment can serve as a 
deterrent in the enforcement of interna-
tional legal principles. Article 7 of the In-
ternational Military Tribunal so stated, 
"The official position of defendants, 
whether as Heads of State or responsible 
officials in Government Departments shall 
not be considered as freeing them from 
responsibility or mitigating punishment." 
Fifth, those who condemned the 
Charter of the International Military Tri-
bunal claimed the doctrine of Superior 
Orders was a complete defense to in-
dividual criminal responsibility; since 
those charged with war crimes were only 
acting in obedience to the orders of their 
military superiors. By definition, the 
Superior Orders doctrine shielded in-
dividuals from personal liability when 
they acted under the compulsion of a 
command given by their superiors. It was 
insisted that a rejection of the Superior 
Orders doctrine would wage havoc be-
tween the relations of a soldier or govern-
ment official to his State. Anarchy might 
result if the individual placed his duty to 
the world community ahead of obedience 
to his government and set himself up as 
the judge of his obligations superior to the 
judgment of his government. 
This final contention was dismissed as 
anathema to universal standards of 
humanitarian behavior which transcended 
the duty of obedience to national laws. As 
St. Thomas Acquinas stated, "Man is 
bound to obey secular rulers to the extent 
that the order of justice requires. lf such 
rulers. . command things to be done 
which are unjust, their subjects are not 
obliged to obey them. .". The argu-
ment against the Superior Orders doctrine 
was one dictated by reason. The Nazi 
leaders had followed orders which were so 
barbarous and patently unlawful that they 
must or should have realized that their ac-
tions violated all humanitarian concepts 
ever espoused in international treaties or 
developed through custom on the laws of 
warfare. Clearly, whenever the illegality 
of an individual's actions are so blatant to 
him, an order from a superior cannot ex-
culpate his guilt. Additionally, there was a 
large realm of freedom of choice open to 
the Nazi assassins; they did not obey due 
to justifiable fears of severe punishment 
or brutal execution. On the contrary, the 
voluminous records kept by the Nazi 
butchers, stating with meticulous preci-
sion their various tortures and slaughters, 
resembled progress reports. These in-
criminating documents were ostensibly 
kept by the Nazi leaders to prove their 
loyalty to Hitler. Undoubtedly these 
detailed manuscripts were preserved in 
order to insure future opportunities for 
political advancement once Germany won 
the war. To permit such calculated and 
well documented depravity to evade 
punishment because of the technical, out-
dated doctrine of Superior Orders was in-
herently unreasonable. An acknowledg-
ment of the Superior Orders doctrine 
could only serve as an obstruction to 
world order and peace. As Holland, the 
prominent twentieth century author 
stated, "Individuals offending against the 
laws of war are liable to such punishment 
as is proscribed by the military code of the 
belligerent into whose hands they may 
fall, or, in default of such codes, then to 
such punishment as may be ordered in ac-
cordance with the laws and usages of war, 
by a military court." Accordingly, Article 
8 of the Charter for the International Mili-
tary Tribunal stated, "The fact that the 
defendant acted pursuant to order of his 
Government or of a superior shall not free 
him from responsibility, but may be con-
sidered in mitigation of punishment if the 
Tribunal determines that justice so re-
quires." 
* * * 
Individual Nazi criminals were held 
responsible for their actions because, 
realistically, no good can result from the 
punishment of an entire State for its con-
duct during wartime. Such punishment of 
a State only sustains deep feelings of 
hostility, which later may be used by a 
ruthless leader to reunite the State in 
seeking revenge by waging aggressive 
war. This is precisely what occurred as a 
repercussion of the unsound reparation 
policies punishing Germany after World 
War I. In essence, the Germans felt the 
Treaty of Versailles was a cruel, humiliat-
ing peace and Hitler skillfully played upon 
this national grievance in appealing to the 
people's sympathies. 
The psychological effect of such grisly 
mass extermination, impressed upon the 
world the need to firmly resolve the issue 
of aggressive warfare by setting a prece-
dent cautioning future leaders that they 
would never again be able to transgress 
international law by such an unholy con-
quest. Retrospectively, the lack of 
strength of the League of Nations, ex-
hibited by its failure to enforce interna-
tional responsibilities, and the timidity of 
individual States to oppose outright ag-
gression, leads to the inescapable conclu-
sion that the only Viable means of deter-
rence is the specific deSignation of ag-
gressive warfare as a criminal, punishable 






by Walter R. Hayes, Jr. 
After you safely wend your way to the 
sanctuary of clean air and free breathing 
on the west side of our library, your gaze 
will no doubt fall from time to time on the 
Md. Annotated Code. Next to these 
tomes, a new creature is breeding, shed-
ding basic black for a brighter coat of 
maroon. No, this is not a case of reverse 
discrimination. What lies before you is the 
revised edition of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland. 
Article III, section 17 of the Md. Con-
stitution of 1851, required the legislature 
"to appoint 2 commissioners learned in 
the law, to revise and codify the laws of 
this state". From this decree was born the 
code of 1860. 
In 1886 another bulk reviSion of the 
code was ordered by the legislature. This 
code was adopted by chapter 74, Acts of 
1888 as the "Code of public laws and 
code of public local laws of this state, 
respectively, in lieu of and as substitute 
for all public general law and public local 
law of this state in force on the first 
Wednesday of January in the year 1888". 
It is this endeavor which is housed in the 
black volumes of the Annotated Code. It 
contains 101 articles, which are, accord-
ing to the revisors' manual, "arranged 
alphabetically with little apparent effort 
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